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RECENT CASE NOTES
defamation is not a law requiring care and caution in greater or less degrees,
but a law of absolute liability qualified by an absolute exception.19
Admitting there is authority to support the imposition of absolute liability,
is such a result socially desirable? Is not this relationship, springing, as it
does, out of justifiable reliance, sufficient? Since the purpose of imposing
liability is the prevention of injury, it seems logical to have the pressure
brought to bear upon the one who controls the processes of production. It is
in such cases as this that liability for innocent misrepresentations might well
be imposed. Accordingly, it is submitted that although this is a new doctrine,
it is one which conforms to the needs of our modern economic society. There-
fore, a manufacturer who makes material representations relative to qualities
possessed by its products, knowing that such statements will be relied on,
should be held to strict liability for injuries to life, limb, or property, which
may be caused by lack of the qualities represented, although the parties are
not in privity of contract.
In conclusion it should be recognized that this is not a liability of warranty
or in deceit or negligence, but an absolute tort liability arising out of the
parties' relations in society.2 0  I.K.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIMrrATION OF INDEBTEDNESS-Action by Jefferson
School Township against Jefferson Township School Building Company to
secure the cancellation of a lease contract which the former contended placed
its indebtedness in excess 6f the amount which it could incur under Article 13
of the Indiana Constitution. The defendant was organized pursuant to an
act of the Indiana General Assembly of 1927 for the purpose of erecting a
school building which was to be used by Jefferson School Township, under
terms and conditions of a combined lease and contract, object of which was to
enable the school township eventually to become owner of the building. The
lease was for a term of 26 years, rent to be paid semi-annually, with an
option to purchase the property at any time, such purchase price in no event
to exceed amount actually invested by the lessor corporation. The school
township was to pay taxes and insurance, and make any repairs and improve-
ments necessary. If the rental payments should at any time exceed the amount
necessary to meet incidental corporate expenses and to pay dividends and
interest on outstanding securities of the lessor, such excess should be used in
the redemption and -cancellation of its securities at their par value; and if
the total excess of rental payments should be sufficient to redeem the out-
standing securities of the lessor and pay accrued interest and dividends, it
would convey all its right, title, and interest in and to the premises and
property in question to the lessee. In conclusion, the lease provided that
"nothing herein shall be construed to provide or impose any obligation on the
part of the lessee to purchase such schoolbuilding and property from the lessor,
19Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 Harvard L. Rev.
426; Artemus Jones (1909), 2 K. B. 444. (Query, should the interest of
reputation be awarded a greater degree of protection by the law than an
interest in bodily safety?)
20 For further study in this field see: Miller, Scienter in Deceit and Estoppel,
6 Indiana L. J1. 153; Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or
Warranty, 42 Harvard L. Rev. 732; Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional,
Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentations, 24 Illinois L. Rev. 749.
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nor to create any obligation of the lessee in respect to any creditor, stockholder
or other security holder of the lessor." Held, the constitutional debt limitation
was not violated.'
The purpose of the constitutional limitation on indebtedness is to protect
persons and property in municipalities from abuse of corporate tredit and the
consequent burdensome, if not ruinous, taxation. 2 School districts are uni-
versally held to be political or municipal corporations within the constitutional
prohibition.$ Although some cases have held that as soon as a contract is
made, indebtedness to the amount of all future payments is incurred, irrespec-
tive of any conditions connected with the rendition of the services,4 the great
weight of authority is that where an ordinary lease is entered into by a
municipal corporation, at a reasonable rental,- for a term of more than one
year, a present indebtedness is not created in the aggregate sum of all the
annual payments of rent to become due under the lease.5 And such a lease,
even though it includes an option to purchase the property,6 does not violate
a constitutional -provision limiting the indebtedness which may be incurred by
municipal corporation to a stated percentage of the value of taxable property
therein, if the annual installments as they become due do not bring the indebted-
ness to a point beyond the constitutional limit. If the aggregate sum of all
yearly rentals were taken as a debt, many cities would be left without means
of securing things essential to public welfare and safety.7 But if a contract
which, though denominated as and purporting to be a lease with option to
purchase is in fact a contract to purchase by payments in installments, it is
treated as a contract to purchase instead of a lease. 8 The court ignores the
form and looks at the substance. 9 Intent and purpose of the parties control
as to whether the agreement is a lease or contract and a recital that it is a
1Jefferson School Tp. v. Jefferson Tp. School Building Co. (Ind., 1937),
10 N. E. (2d) 608.
2 Law v. People (1877), 87 Ill. 385; Eddy Valve Co. v. Town Crown Point
(1906), 166 Ind. 613, 76 N. E. 536; 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, p. 342.
81 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, p. 348.
4 Schnell v. City of Rockland (1908), 232 I1. 89, 83 N. E. 462; East St.
Louis & Interurban Water Co. v. City of Bellville (1935), 360 I1. 490, 196
N. E. 442; Jones .v. Rutherford (1928), 225 Ky. 773, 10 S. W. (2d) 296;
Smith v. Newburgh (1879), 77 N. Y. 130; 1 Dillion, Municipal Corporations,
p. 359; 19 R. C. L. 984-5.
5 Valparaiso v. Gardner (1884), 97 Ind. 1, 49 Am. Rep. 419; Cason v.
City of Lebanon (1899), 153 Ind. 567, 55 N. E. 768; 1 Dillon, Municipal
Corporations, p. 351, 361, and cases cited; Cooley, Handbook Municipal Cor-
porations, p. 417; 19 R. C. L. 984-5 and cases cited.
6 Cohran v. Town of Middleton (1924), 14 Del. Ch. 295, 125 A. 459;
Burlington Water Co. v. Woodward (1878), 49 Ia. 58; City of South Bend
v. Reynolds (1900), 155 Ind. 70, 57 N. E. 706, 708, 49 L..R. A. 795; Kren-
winke v. City of Los Angeles (1936), 4 Cal. (2d) 611, 51 P. (2d) 1098;
1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, p. 376 and cases cited.
7Valparaiso v. Gardner (1884), 97 Ind. 1, 49 Am. Rep. 419.
8 Voss v. Waterloo Water Co. (1904), 163 Ind. 69, 71 N. E. 208, 66 L. R. A
95, 106 A. S. R. 201; Billings v. Bankers' Bond Co. (1923), 199 Ky. 490, 251
S. W. 643; Spilman v. Parkersburg (1891), 35 W. Va. 605, 14 S. E. 279;
Earles v. Wells (1896), 94 Wis. 285, 68 N. W. 964; 71 A. L. R. 1323; 19
R. C. L. 984.
9 State ex. rel. Matthews v. Forsythe (1896), 147 Ind. 466, 473, 44 N. E.
593.
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leaselO or stipulation that it is not to be deemed to create an obligation or
indebtedness'1 can not change its true character.
Indiana courts have followed the majority rule, upholding as leases contracts
by municipal corporations for articles of necessity and services to be supplied
in the future and paid for as supplied.1 2 In one case, the court extended the
doctrine to the leasing of a city hall, reasoning that offices were as essential
as light, water, gas, and the like.13 But where the court has found the contract
to be merely a device to evade the debt limit, 1 4 it has held that a present
indebtedness in the aggregate was created. 1 5
The difficulty in reconciling cases of this kind comes in deciding just where
courts will draw the line between leases and contracts to purcliase in install-
ments. In its holding the court in the instant case attempted at length to
distinguish the present situation from Hively v. Nappanee,16 declaring a lease
a contract to purchase in installments, and to apply the rule of City of South
Bend v. Reynolds,'7 upholding a lease. In the Hively case the school city
leased a building for 25 years, which the court ruled was the life of the
building, at a certain rental. The school city was to pay taxes, and keep
the property insured and repaired, and was to have an option to renew the
lease, or to purchase the building at a price not to exceed the amount actually
remaining invested in the property by the building company. In the Reynolds
case, decided 30 years before, a city hall was built by the lessor on the city's
property, the city paying rent, taxes, etc., with an option to purchase at any
time by paying remainder of contract price plus interest.
In distinguishing the two cases, the court made much of the fact that the
rental in the Hively case was far in excess of a reasonable amount and that
if the city did not go ahead and purchase the property the excess which was
applied on the bonds would be lost, while in the earlier case the rent was no
more than the fair rental value of the building, the lessee had to perform a
further act, that is, exercise its option to buy, before it could become owner
of the building, and nothing was mentioned of a possible intent to evade the
constitutional provision. In following the Hively case in Bryant 'V. Town
10 Mahoney v. San Francisco (1927), 201 Cal. 248, 257 P. 49.
11 Hively v. School City of Nappanee (1930), 202 Ind. 28, 169 N. E. 51, 53,
171 N. E. 381, 71 A. L. R. 1311.
12 Valparaiso v. Gardner (1884), 97 Ind. 1, 49 Am. Rep. 419; Crowder v.
Town of Sullivan (1891), 128 Ind. 486, 28 N. E. 94; City of Laporte v. Game-
well Fire Alarm Telegraph Co. (1896), 146 Ind. 466, 45 N. E. 588; Board,
etc. v. Gardner (1900), 155 Ind. 165, 57 N. E. 903; City of Logansport v.
Dykeman (1888), 116 Ind. 15, 17 N. E. 587; Scott, Indiana Municipal Law,
p. 51.
1a City of South Bend v. Reynolds (1900), 155 Ind. 70, 57 N. E. 706, 708,
49 L. R. A. 795.
14 Voss v. Waterloo Water Co. (1904), 163 Ind. 69, 71 N. E. 208, 66
L. R. A. 95, 106 A. S. R. 201.
15 Hively v. School City of Napanee (1930), 202 Ind. 28, 169 N. E. 51, 53,
171 N. E. 381, 71 A. L. R. 1311; Bryant v. School Town of Oakland City
(1930), 202 Ind. 254, 171 N. E. 378.
16 Hively v. School City of Nappanee (1930), 202 Ind. 28, 169 N. E. 51,
53, 171 N. E. 381, 71 A. L. R. 1311.
17 City of South Bend v. Reynolds (1900), 155 Ind. 70, 57 N. E. 706, 708, 49
L. R. A. 795.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of Oakland City,1s the court ignored this distinction, and apparently thought
that underlying the lease was the same purpose to evade the law in one as
in the other. The instant decision does not mention the Bryant case.
Ignoring the cases altogether, it seems, on principle, if we look at the
substance of the transaction1 9 and remember that the constitutional limitation
is effective against both expressed and implied liability,2 0 that the present
decision is incorrect. If and when the rental payments retired the investments
of the lessor, the school township became owner of the property without even
exercising its option to purchase. The lessor received no profits-it was no
more than a dummy through whose hands the cost of construction of the
building was to pass from the township to the security holders. Thus, it
would seem that this case is an evasion of the constitutional limitation and is
inconsistent with both principle and established precedent. M. J. W.
PAYMENTS-SURETY's RIGHT TO DIRECT APPLIcATIN.-Defendant was surety
for the Karstedt Construction Company on a contract requiring repairs on a
school building. Plaintiff, a subcontractor, performed certain work for the
Construction Company, and applied payments made out of proceeds of the
secured contract on prior claims arising out of other contracts. Plaintiff
brought the present action to recover from the surety the amount of the
indebtedness arising out of the assured contract. Defendant contends that
the payments from funds arising out of the present contract should be applied
on debts arising out of the same contract. Held, in the absence of direction
by the debtor, the creditor may apply the payments received to any claim due
him from the debtor regardless of his knowledge of the source of the funds.1
In regard to the' right of the surety to have the proceeds of the contract
which he assures applied to the claims arising out of the contract, there are
three distinct rules adopted by the courts: First, regardless of the knowledge
of the source of the payments received, the creditor must apply them to the
secured claims;2 Second, if the creditor knows the source of the payments,
he must apply them to the secured claims;8 Third, regardless of knowledge,
the creditor may apply the payments as he sees fit.4 Before discussing the
various rules, it is well to note some of the general rules as to the application
of payments. In the first place, the debtor has the right to say how the pay-
ments which he makes shall be applied.5 In the absence of direction by the
18 Bryant v. School Town of Oakland City (1930), 202 Ind. 254, 171 N. E.
378.
19 State ex. rel. Matthews v. Forsythe (1896), 147 Ind. 466, 473, 44 N. E.
593.
20 Eddy Valve Co. v. Town Crown Point (1906), 166 Ind. 613.
1 Western & Southern Indemnity Co. v. Cramer (1937), 10 N. E. (2d) 440,
(Ind. App. Court).
2 Columbia Digger Co. v. Sparks (1915), 227 F. 780; Crane Co. v. Pacific
Heat Co. (1904), 36 Wash. 95, 78 P. 460.
3Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dupree (1931), 223 Ala. 420, 136 S. 811;
Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1916), 92 Wash. 52, 158 P. 740;
Salt Lake City v. O'Connor (1926), 68 Utah 233, 249 P. 810.
4 Grover v. Board of Education (1928), 102 N. 3. Eq. 415, 141 A. 81;
City of Marshfield v. United States Fidelity Co. (1929), 128 Ore. 547, 274 P.
503; Standard Oil v. Day (1924), 161 Minn. 281, 201 N. W. 410.
5Trentman v. Fletcher (1885), 100 Ind. 105.
